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New Copyright Stories: Clearing the Way for Fair
Wages and Equitable Working Conditions in
American Theater and other Creative Industries
JESSICA SILBEY
We need some new intellectual property stories. By stories, I don’t mean
entertaining fictions. I mean instead accounts or explanations that make sense
of the world as it is lived by everyday people.1 Most of our relevant intellectual
property laws were forged in the mid-twentieth century and have failed to keep
pace with the transformations in creative and innovative practices of the twentyfirst.2 Being out-of-sync or failing to recognize broader existing stakeholders
means laws are poorly aligned with on-the-ground realities and are out-of-touch
with values and interests of the people laws serve.3 The Article at the center of
this Symposium by Brent Salter and Professor Catherine Fisk is a thoroughly
scathing critique of just this disconnect, between a triad of legal regimes

 Professor of Law and Yanakakis Law Faculty Research Scholar, Boston University
School of Law, Boston, Massachusetts. My deepest thanks to Catherine Fisk and Brent Salter
for inviting me to write this essay and be in direct conversation with their important work.
1 See generally Jessica Silbey, The Mythical Beginnings of Intellectual Property Law,
15 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 319 (2008) (describing the heuristic role of origin stories in
intellectual property law) [hereinafter Silbey, Mythical]. See Carole M. Rose, Property as
Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE
J. L. & HUMAN. 37, 39 (1990) (explaining that the property regime needs a rhetorical mode
of narrative and storytelling to overcome “glitches” in the doctrinal accounts); JESSICA
SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 12, 17–18 (2015) [hereinafter THE EUREKA MYTH].
2 Recent amendments to U.S. IP law, such as the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
(AIA) (2011), amending the Patent Act, and the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
(CTEA) (1998), were motivated primarily to harmonize U.S. law with European law. See
Mark Schafer, How the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act Sought to Harmonize United States
Patent Priority with the World, a Comparison with the European Patent Convention, 12
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L REV. 807, 807 (2013); Victoria A. Grzelak, Mickey Mouse &
Sonny Bono Go to Court: The Copyright Term Extension Act and Its Effect on Current and
Future Rights, 2 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 95, 101 (2002). The Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA), also enacted in 1998, established the “notice and takedown regime”
of copyright enforcement on the internet and was credited with growing the internet by
immunizing platforms and facilitating user-generated content. See 17 U.S.C. § 512.
3 The difference between “law on the books” and “law in action” is an old one, see
generally Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910), and
its evaluation and critique is the basis of the law and society movement. See Susan S. Silbey
& Austin Sarat, Critical Traditions in Law and Society Research, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
165, 170–71 (1987).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4142700

30

A RESPONSE TO FISK & SALTER

[Vol. 83

(antitrust, labor law, and copyright) and the practices and needs of freelance
dramatists that drive American theater.4
The Article identifies four core assumptions about this triad of legal
regimes, and it explains how these assumptions constrain the just applications
of these laws to freelance writers’ work. By uncovering these assumptions and
demonstrating their contingencies and fragility, the authors lead us to, but do
not fully rehearse, the new foundations on which a fair labor system of
dramaturgs’ work would be built. We might think of these new foundations as
the new IP stories that explain how, for example, copyright functions in fact for
playwrights and other writers. These new stories could liberate the freelancers
from the false constraints derived from the interaction of current copyright law,
labor law, and antitrust law. Because I study and write about intellectual
property law and am not a labor law or antitrust scholar, this short response
essay will propose new stories specifically for copyright law. But the essay’s
focus doesn’t preclude similar narrative and rhetorical work in the other fields.
Salter and Fisk describe several core sticking points for playwrights in the
web of copyright, antitrust, and labor law. The first is playwrights’ insistence
on being designated “independent contractors” under copyright law, which
assures they retain copyright in their authored plays rather than being employees
whose authored work is “for hire” and owned by employers. The second is that
the independent contractor status precludes their unionization as dramatists
under the National Labor Relations Act and antitrust law. The third point is that
were the Dramatists Guild a union dramaturgs would lose creative autonomy
that is essential to producing good work, even though as non-unionized
freelancers currently, they lack the leverage and power to negotiate fair wages
and meaningful control over their plays. As the authors write, “The irony of the
Guild’s insistence that playwrights are independent contractors who benefit
from ownership of copyrights is that they insist, as a matter of artistic autonomy,
on the conditions that make them vulnerable in matters of labor and antitrust.”5
Why are the playwrights vulnerable? Over the course of the twentieth
century, while the economic power of major theater producers has grown, other
unionized workers (such as actors, set designers, musicians, and composers)
have bargained for larger portions of the theatrical profits,6 and this leaves
independent playwrights in a “precarious legal status” where they must depend
upon the one legal straw they believe provides them “important protection”:
copyright ownership.7 But, as the authors recognize, “copyright ownership
seems increasingly to provide neither economic security nor creative
autonomy.”8 This is of course mostly true only for those copyright owners
4 See generally Brent Salter & Catherine Fisk, Assumptions About Antitrust and
Freelance Work and the Fragility of Labor Relations in the American Theatre, 83 OHIO ST.
L. J. 217 (2022).
5 Id. at 273.
6 See id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
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without leverage or power. Copyright in the hands of Microsoft or Universal
Studios may in fact provide significant economic security and autonomy. The
story of copyright’s impotence that Salter and Fisk tell is copyright for the 99%.
Why, then, do the dramaturgs insist on holding tight to their copyrights, leaving
them “impecunious” (as Salter and Fisk say)? And what accounts for the
dramatists’ blinders that prevents them from appreciating the fuller picture
revealing the futility of existing copyright doctrine for most everyday creators?
This is where new IP stories are relevant to explain the dramaturgs’ situation.
Salter and Fisk propose decoupling independent contractor status under
copyright law from labor law as one way out of the bind.9 They do so to avoid
the problem of inconsistency between the three regimes, emphasizing that a
“work for hire” under copyright law should have no bearing on the Dramatists
Guild ability to bargain collectively under the NLRA.10 To be sure, the
insistence on consistency of terminology and its application across regimes
looks and sounds logical, which is important in law: if you’re an “independent
contractor” under copyright law, you shouldn’t be designated an “employee” for
the purpose of labor law. But insisting on superficial consistencies across
disparate legal regimes is a trick of the powerful; and in order to retain power,
they avoid making sense of distinctions in the particular historical evolution of
a legal framework or in its current application, which distinctions matter for
achieving its stated goals. For these reasons, Salter and Fisk explain that
insisting on consistency can be irrational—and thus decoupling the terms makes
sense; this is a fine start.11 But to my mind it’s not the first step in evaluating
the problem. The first step is to expose the assumptions with which the authors
start as based on deeply-felt but false ideological beliefs (or myths) that
legitimate certain relations between creators and copyright as inevitable (when
they’re not) and which structure intellectual property doctrine.12 This mythmaking in IP law tends to reinforce the power dynamics of existing institutional
structures and fails to account for the everyday creators and innovators who are
also intended to be beneficiaries of IP law.13 What follows is a rewriting of these
myths in the form of new stories that account for the practices and needs of
everyday creators and innovators and that expose the assumptions, which the
Article rightly criticizes, as not inevitable and thus subject to change.
New story #1: Copyright retention does not assure creative autonomy or
control. Creative autonomy and control most plausibly derive from work
conditions and professional relationships, which IP law only weakly affects, if
at all.
Playwrights appear to insist on “independent contractor” status to retain
their copyright and maintain creative control over their work. In other words,
9 Id. at 274.
10 Salter & Fisk, supra note 4, at 274.
11 See id. at 274–75 (pointing out that the NLRB has at least two versions of its own

common law test depending on the political party in power).
12 See generally Silbey, Mythical, supra note 1.
13 Id.
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they seek creative autonomy and control over the conditions of their work and
of its output through copyright ownership. But why assume that retention of
copyright achieves those goals? This assumption is shot through with theories
connecting property ownership to master-servant relationships and individual
liberation and self-realization. It elides copyright with real property and
financial surplus, and it partakes in the myth that romanticizes the “author” as
the master of the work. Putting aside the enduring debates about whether
“intellectual property” is enough like real or personal property for these theories
to hold (to my mind, it is not),14 and whether real property ownership in fact
provides the kind of dominion and control over the circumstances of our lives
and work that the playwrights seek, there are lessons from copyright law and
accounts from the playwrights that demonstrate how copyright ownership does
not achieve these goals and instead how they can be accomplished in other ways.
Consider the case of New York Times Co. v. Tasini (2001).15 At issue in
Tasini was whether freelance writers, when granting publishing rights to
newspapers and periodicals, included in that grant the right to republish the
newspaper and periodical in an electronic database such as LexisNexis as part
of a “collective work” under section 201(c) of the Copyright Act.16 Freelancers
said no—those rights were extra and needed to be separately licensed—and they
sued to require the New York Times to relicense their work for digital databases
and pay them extra fees.17
A majority of the Supreme Court sided with the freelancers, interpreting
section 201(c) to strengthen authors’ rights and “conclud[ing] that the 201(c)
privilege [granted to publishers] does not override the Authors’ copyrights.”18
The majority quoted a 2001 report from the Register of Copyrights as support
for the author’s rights approach that “freelance authors have experienced
significant economic loss” due to a “digital revolution that has given publishers
[new] opportunities to exploit authors’ works.”19 Based on this, the Court read
section 201(c) in light of digital age publisher domination and challenges to
labor equity; its interpretation restricted publishers’ “privilege” and benefitted
authors through expanded republication rights.20 On one reading, the Tasini
opinion is an interpretation of the Copyright Act that admirably attempts to
protect freelance authors (at the expense of publishers and media outlets like the
New York Times) from the dwindling paid opportunities in the digital age for

14 For a summary and analysis of the literature and the concept, see generally Julie E.
Cohen, Property as Institutions for Resources: Lessons from and for IP, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1
(2015), and Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property
Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1 (2004).
15 New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 483 (2001).
16 Id. at 487.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 493.
19 Id. at 498 n.6.
20 Id. at 498.
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copying and reproducing their freelance work, which increasingly disseminates
online for free.
But what has happened since the Tasini opinion? Freelancers are not any
better off; and, in fact, by many accounts (including those in the Salter and Fisk
article), they are in a more precarious professional position than ever.21 In fact,
the Tasini dissent predicted just this slide toward increased inequality and loss
of market power despite the majority’s broadened scope of copyright, thereby
implying that more or stronger copyright for freelancers was not the root of (or
solution to) the problem. Dissenting in Tasini, Justice Stevens wrote that, among
other problems, the majority’s rule “in favor of authors [today] may have the
perverse consequence of encouraging publishers to demand from freelancers a
complete transfer of copyright”22 for no more money in the future. Justice
Stevens presciently recognized in 2001 that more or broader copyright did not
give the freelancers more or stronger bargaining power. This prediction has
come true, with publishers demanding a complete transfer or unlimited use of
authors’ work for no higher fees or more control than before. Publishers demand
more for the same fee (or less) because freelancers need the work and publishers
can insist on the terms.23
The Tasini decision may have been honorable in its approach strengthening
authors’ copyright as a matter of historical necessity and dignity, but in doing
so it failed to ensure equal opportunity to wield a stronger copyright and thus
was an incomplete solution to the problem of inequality in the publishing
industry. Tasini’s reasoning left authors to negotiate on their own without real
bargaining power against aggregators and publishers who continued to grow
their leverage and market power against independent writers. In sum—and this
is part one of the counter-narrative to the dramatists’ insistence on retaining their
copyright by remaining independent contractors—copyright doesn’t grant
power, and thus it also doesn’t provide the negotiating leverage to demand the
autonomy and control that writers seek.
And why should it? What writers really want, according to the Salter and
Fisk article, is “stability[,] a regular income, health insurance . . . [and] long
term collaborations.”24 This is part two of the first new story: copyright is
incidental to the goals the writers seek. They are not looking for a financial
jackpot (as if copyright would predictably provide that anyway), but instead

21 See Salter & Fisk, supra note 4, at 273.
22 Tasini, 533 U.S. at 520 n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
23 I analyze the Tasini opinion in more detail in chapter 2 of my book: JESSICA SILBEY,

AGAINST PROGRESS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FUNDAMENTAL VALUES IN THE
INTERNET AGE 87–155 [hereinafter SILBEY, AGAINST PROGRESS].
24 Salter & Fisk, supra note 4, at 221. I investigated this claim and showed it to be true
in large part in THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, which was based on an empirical study of creators and innovators
for whom IP was at best only a partial solution to the problems they face in their professional
lives. See generally THE EUREKA MYTH, supra note 1.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4142700

34

A RESPONSE TO FISK & SALTER

[Vol. 83

they seek steady, meaningful work.25 They also seek creative independence and
the ability to prevent the rewriting of their work26 – a professional autonomy
that respects their creative contributions. Notably, these goals are harmonious
with their recognition that collaborations among artists within the theater
community results in their plays being adapted and transformed by the very
artists that celebrate them. Copyright retention does not assure the nontransformation of their work by others; the director, producer, actors, set
designers, etc. will insist on creative autonomy too!
What structures or rules assure the production of good work, at a steady
pace, under conditions of mutual respectful creative collaborations?
Professional relationships and norms within the industry, along with certain
contract or licensing provisions that are negotiated in light of those norms,
assure playwrights both creative autonomy and meaningful control to see their
work produced with integrity. As Salter and Fisk explain at the end of the article:
“the fact relationships have endured and theater continues to be made under such
a fragile framework says something rather profound about the desire of all
stakeholders to find a compromise in order to achieve the shared goal of actual
production.”27
Copyright does not guarantee professional norms of respect and deference
to expertise. It doesn’t guarantee job stability, quality theater, or the continuance
of long-term collaborations. Copyright’s existential crisis for independent
authors is that it is largely impotent in the face of industry power that structures
the terms of work, including the production and dissemination of creative
expression.28 The story that the playwrights assume to be true is of the solitary
romantic author and the power of the author’s copyright as potent capital.29 But
the story they live consists of supportive professional relationships and
collaborations across various dimensions of theatrical production (among
actors, set designers, directors, musicians, composers) that assure relative
creative autonomy, respectful collaborations, and quality theater. The one piece
of the puzzle that gives them trouble is the relationship with producers and
theater owners—those with most of the money and outsized influence because
of their land holdings that determine the venues.30 But copyright can’t reshape
this piece of the puzzle. And this leads to the second new story that needs to be
told.
25
26
27
28

THE EUREKA MYTH, supra note 1, at 274.
Salter & Fisk, supra note 4, at 222.
Id. at 276–77.
See generally Jessica Silbey, Eva E. Subotnik & Peter DiCola, Existential Copyright
and Professional Photography, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 263 (2019).
29 This is another way of phrasing the authors’ explanation that “employee status and
intellectual property rights are shot through with arguments celebrating the importance of
entrepreneurship and benefits of self-regulation.” Salter & Fisk, supra note 4, at 278.
30 Id. at 270. “[T]he challenge for playwrights negotiating individually ‘as the
ownership of theatres and production of plays has become increasingly dominated by
corporate interests.’” Id.
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New story #2: Copyright by itself does not create collective power.
Copyright is only a weak status symbol of authorship and origination and
assures no financial or professional success or institutional power. Fetishizing
copyright and diminishing other organizational or institutional norms or
priorities leads to isolation and the neglect of background structures, attention
to which could support the regular accomplishment of good work through
collective action and consensual community formation.
This story is a hard pill to swallow for author’s rights advocates who
regularly champion stronger and broader copyright to support the so-called
struggling author.31 But, really, this is an old story in new clothes. It resembles
the one told in 1710 in England, in which publishers used authors as a shill to
maintain their publishing privilege to enact the Statute of Anne, the first
copyright statute naming authors as beneficiaries but which mostly kept
publishers in positions of power.32 It also resembles the story told in 1998 in the
United States, in which wealthy musical celebrities argued ostensibly on behalf
of all musicians and other copyright authors (but also for Disney Corporation)
about the devaluation of copyright in the digital age and thus the need for
perpetual copyright rather than a limited term copyright.33 The Copyright Term
Extension Act was passed in 1998 providing 20 more years of term to all future
and existing copyright owners on the theory that longer and stronger copyright
would more fully compensate all copyright owners. But the only owners that
benefited from the extension were those for whom the last twenty years of a life
plus seventy year term translates into any fees at all (which is no one except the
mega-stars and their business partners).34 Dramatists are caught telling a similar
story asserting the importance of copyright for the independent authors’
professional livelihood when in fact that “independent contractor” status serves
to augment the power of the producers and theater owners who control the
production of the dramatists’ plays. Copyright isn’t helping them much; and it
may be hurting them.
Salter and Fisk demonstrate that copyright rules are no match for labor and
antitrust law, which dominate the conditions of work for writers and other
31 This is essentially what Tasini was about. See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, The
Author’s Place in the Future of Copyright, in COPYRIGHT IN AN AGE OF EXCEPTIONS AND
LIMITATIONS (Ruth Okediji ed., 2017) (exploring various avenues of protecting an author’s
full range of interest, with or without copyright).
32 MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 4–5 (1993).
33 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 186 (2003); see also JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL
COPYRIGHT 23–49 (2017) (providing a history of the 1998 copyright legislation and the
skewed legislative dynamics favoring industry over individual authors). For a history of the
CTEA (and the DMCA), see generally BILL D. HERMAN, THE FIGHT OVER DIGITAL RIGHTS:
THE POLITICS OF COPYRIGHT AND TECHNOLOGY (2013).
34 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 254–55 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[I]f, after 55 to 75 years, only
2% of all copyrights retain commercial value, the percentage surviving after 75 years or more
(a typical pre-extension copyright term)—must be far smaller . . . a 1% likelihood of earning
$100 annually for 20 years, starting 75 years into the future, is worth less than seven cents
today.”).
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creators. They describe how labor and antitrust laws (not copyright) shape the
opportunities for fair, sustainable pay as well as the nature and form of firms
that are employers. Copyright held by these firms may be consequential. But
copyright held by individuals working for these firms is not.35 Caught up in the
symbolism of copyright as designating independence in a master/servant
relationship, playwrights overlook the possibility that being an employee or
being less independent as member of a group is not necessarily a condition of
unfreedom but of power. Playwrights are stuck believing that maintaining their
professional status as dramaturgs requires retention of an impotent copyright,
while simultaneously copyright diminishes their power to demand a sustainable
living from theater owners because of collective bargaining rules. And thus,
dramatists fail to focus where they should: on the establishment or maintenance
of professional norms and organizations that shape quality and mutual respect
among all the collaborators necessary to produce a show, which organization
and structure could be the basis of resistance to the monopolistic power of the
theater owners and producers.
I’ve seen this same problem play out among digital photographers in the
internet age. In the mid-1990s and early 2000s, professional photographers
experienced the consolidation of publishing and media outlets that came on the
heels of the dot-com bubble.36 Losing revenue from on-line readership, media
companies started cutting photography staff and insisting on broad licensing
terms for use of photographs but for no more money despite the wider audience
on the internet.37 Without collective power, the photographers who were
desperate to continue working agreed to contract terms that diminished their pay
but extended the licensees’ rights in their photographs.38 Those photographers
who insisted on and secured more money and better terms at the outset were not
hired again because media firms like Condé Nast, who were growing
exponentially in size by acquiring smaller outlets, could easily find another
photographer to work for less money down the road.39 Professional
photographer organizations, such as Editorial Photography and American
Society of Media Photographers (ASMP), could not convince its members to
collectively insist on contract terms that would maintain sustainable wages. And
younger photographers who were not yet members or who had not yet
35 Molly Van Houweling describes this problem as “atomism”—“the proliferation,

distribution, and fragmentation of the exclusive rights bestowed by copyright law” —for
which one solution is to “to restrict, consolidate, unify, and standardize” the rights as through
the work-for-hire doctrine, so the copyrights are held by a single entity. Molly Shaffer Van
Houweling, Atomism and Automation, 27 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 1471, 1474 (2012); see also
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author Automony and Atomism in Copyright Law, 96 VA. L.
REV. 549, 632 (2010) (suggesting “coordinating instead of consolidating” as one way to
preserve autonomy in the face of inevitable atomism of copyright in the internet age).
36 See Silbey, Subotnik & DiCola, supra note 28, at 298.
37 See id. at 292–94.
38 See id. at 292–99.
39 See id.
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appreciated the norms of professional photographers were willing to work for
free or failed to see the benefit of old contract terms in a new internet world.
The result has been stagnant wages for photographers over two decades of work
in an internet ecosystem in which photographs play outsized cultural and
informational roles but make money for people and entities other than the
photographers.40
The difference between the digital photographers and freelance playwrights
appears to be the central figure of the Dramatists Guild. As an organization to
which most playwrights dutifully belong, it could play a much more powerful
role in the lives of its members if it could stop fetishizing copyright as the key
to its members’ wellbeing and success. According to Salter and Fisk, the
Dramatists Guild has succeeded in the face of legal uncertainty and constant
threat for over almost 100 years to insist on the independence of its members.41
Perhaps it’s time to recognize their members’ mutual dependence and to demote
independent copyright as the key to the kingdom and to insist instead on the
substantive terms of working conditions that will bring fairer profits and
meaningful authorial control to theater productions. If this revised allocation of
profit and control was possible with directors, actors, choreographers, as Salter
and Fisk explain it was, it can be possible for dramatists as well.42
Standing in the way of this transition are the producers and theater owners,
whose consolidated power set the terms of the debate and facilitated the skewed
perception of the dramatists as a monopoly. The third story exposes the theater
owners’ story as based in avarice and not in creative production to which
copyright aims.
New Story #3: Contrary to the theater owner’s assertions, authors’
independence is not a prerequisite to the production of diverse expression or
healthy competition for plays. The rhetoric of competition and independent
contractors serves only the greed of the theater producers who seek to maximize
profits by preserving their own consolidated market in theater production.
Salter and Fisk explain that the colossal size and scope of the producers’
empire distorts by controlling the market for dramatists’ work.43 As such, it
makes sense that the producers resist the Dramatists Guild’s advocacy on behalf
of playwrights and the possibility of their collective bargaining because
strengthening the Guild will make the producers less money. Producers allege
40 For more description and analysis of the case of digital photographers, see generally
Jessica Silbey, Control over Contemporary Photography: A Tangle of Copyright, Right of
Publicity, and the First Amendment, 42 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 351 (2019), and Jessica Silbey,
Justifying Copyright in the Age of Digital Reproduction: The Case of Photographers, 9 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 405 (2019). See also SILBEY, AGAINST PROGRESS, supra note 23, at 25–87.
41 See Salter & Fisk, supra note 4, at 225.
42 Id. at 271. “[E]conomic changes in theatre have continued, and others involved in
making plays—directors, actors, choreographers—have increased their leverage by claiming
copyrights in their contributions to productions along with the salaries they are paid for their
labor pursuant to their collective agreements.” Id.
43 Id. at 235.
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that keeping writers independent will produce competition among plays—the
idea being that competition elevates quality (more on this below).44 But really
producers seek to keep writers “independent” to keep them powerless and pay
them less in order to guarantee larger profits on the producers’ investments in
the shows. Turning big profits is more difficult today, according to the Article,
because since the 1980s more contributors to theater (such as directors, actors,
musicians, and choreographers) have negotiated claims to the theatrical
profits.45 Keeping the writers “independent” is critical to producer’s profit
margin because a dramatist’s contract price is a last input on which producers
have significant negotiating power.
To keep writers “independent” and without strong bargaining power, theater
producers argue that unions coerce their members, denying them meaningful
choices over their work. But “freedom of individual workers and consumers” is
anti-union rhetoric that serves neither theatrical workers nor its audiences. It
only keeps writers in the precarious position of independence and without
collective power, exactly what producers need to negotiate one-sided contract
terms that keep writers weak and unable to easily improve their circumstances.
It is particularly inapt as rhetoric when the subject is creative production.
In tandem, producers argue that independent writers create a “free market
in theatre” and unionization “would give the Guild a gatekeeper role and the
power to monopolize talent.”46 The idea that independent contractor status is
essential to expressive diversity is laughable, especially if that independent
status produces struggling rather than thriving writers. The notion that one needs
to be poor and hungry to produce great writing is both quaint and cruel. The
related notion that cutthroat competition elevates standards and generates the
best work is specious. And if it was true, wouldn’t it apply as much to producers
and theater companies—whose power and institutional structure is consolidated
in a few entities—as to the writers?
The arguments made by the producers ostensibly on behalf of the writers
and theatrical audiences about competition among playwrights and the
importance of dramatists’ independent status for choice and control is some of
the most self-serving rhetoric within copyright industries that I’ve studied. The
arguments are transparently about maintaining the producers’ own power and
profits and are not about the good of theater community as a whole. The
arguments are also based on false factual premises. The empirical evidence
overwhelmingly shows that what drives authors to do good work is not
competition but, among other things, sustainable and predictable working
conditions and respectful and challenging professional relationships.47 Many
44
45
46
47

See id. at 225.
See id. at 271.
Id.
See THE EUREKA MYTH, supra note 1, at 287–99; see also MIHALY
CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY: FLOW AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DISCOVERY AND
INVENTION 127–51 (1996); TERESA M. AMABILE, CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT: UPDATE TO THE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF CREATIVITY 203–43 (1996). See generally HOWARD E. GARDNER,
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are intrinsically motivated and would work without the carrot of copyright or
the stick of withholding pay.48 The producers arguments about what motivates
quality creative work are dead wrong. The new (or is it old?) story of the
producers’ monopolistic power and self-serving greed at the writers’ expense
underlies some of the assumptions that constrain the dramatists in the triadic
legal regime described in the Article. Exposing this story will further remind
audiences that cutthroat competition and precarity is not necessary for exquisite
creativity.
It is amazing under these conditions of both precarity and outsized power
that live theater continues to thrive today. It bears repeating that Salter and Fisk
remind us, “that these relationships have endured and theatre continues to be
made under such a fragile framework . . . says something rather profound about
the desire of all stakeholders to find a compromise in order to achieve the shared
goal of actual production.”49 I wouldn’t be so kind to the stakeholder producers,
such as the Shuberts, as they are described in this Article. But I am in awe of the
persistence of creative workers within this precarious ecosystem, which is
testament to their devotion to the work itself despite whatever financial rewards
they earn, and which persistence we have witnessed during the pandemic when
theater existed online without traditional producers or theatrical spaces. This
passion thrives despite the voraciousness of producers who use theatrical
productions as investment vehicles and fail to consider all employees and
independent contractors as equally worth sharing in the wealth.
To this, I understand producers will say they take all the risks and therefore
should control the allocation of rewards. But this position undermines their
arguments about the benefits of independence and competition (writers inhabit
risky positions as well!). And it ignores the fact that producers’ risks are
minimized when they can spread it around, as they do, to the hundreds of
theaters they own in the manner of a hedge fund or investment bank. In the end,
the producers’ argument boils down to “we paid for it, so we get to reap the
rewards.” But to my ears, this is just fodder for collective action on behalf of
those who in fact create the art that audiences pay to see and celebrate for years
afterwards. The producer’s specious argument further exposes the real stand-off
between two sorts of value – capital and creativity. If creativity is the end goal,
not capital (and that is, in fact, what copyright claims), then the producers have
the argument all wrong.
These new stories are not really new, they have just been hidden under the
ideology of cost-benefit analyses of intellectual property law’s explanation of
its balance between rights and access, between exclusivity and promoting the
public good. We say without hesitation (and often without factual proof):
exclusive rights that enable rent-seeking are necessary to produce creative or

CREATING MINDS (1993); DANIEL H. PINK, DRIVE: THE SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT WHAT
MOTIVATES US (2009).
48 See THE EUREKA MYTH, supra note 1, at 287–99.
49 Salter & Fisk, supra note 4, at 276–77.
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innovative work. But copyright turns out not to help dramatists. Their exclusive
rights have generated instability and financial uncertainty. Instead, we might
draw on these new stories to identify the contours of a different kind of critical
balance embedded in intellectual property law (copyright in particular)
determined by social values other than wealth aggregation. To be sure, earning
and accumulating money to live and to take care of loved ones is an important
social good. But there are other social goods. When copyright doesn’t provide
that necessary wealth for those contributing to the creative ecosystem, we need
to ask what it’s really for and whose interests it’s serving. The stories underlying
the assumptions that bind the dramatists in a web of copyright, antitrust, and
labor law helpfully expose other values that frame copyright and debates about
creative labor – of mutual interdependence, professional norms, equal treatment,
and distributive justice.50 The dramatists’ distressing situation as described by
Brent Salter and Catherine Fisk is an example of copyright law’s misdirection.
New stories revitalized with these other social values can help set copyright on
a path working for more authors in our complicated but thriving creative
communities.

50 SILBEY, AGAINST PROGRESS, supra note 23, at 4–5 (describing these values as the
emerging dominant frameworks to debate intellectual property law in the internet age).
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